The article offers an 'insider story' of the establishment of the Office of Legal Affairs in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) in 1982/83 and of its increasing involvement in assisting GATT dispute settlement panels and the Uruguay Round negotiations on a new World Trade Organization with compulsory jurisdiction for the settlement of trade disputes (Sections I and II). The transformation, within only one decade, of the anti-legal pragmatism in GATT 1947 into the compulsory WTO dispute settlement system amounted to a 'revolution' in international law. But the 'public reason' governing the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system remains limited, notably by (1) the domination of GATT/WTO decision-making by governments interested in limiting their own legal, democratic and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens for their often welfare-reducing trade restrictions and distortions; (2) the deliberate neglect for the customary law requirements of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes 'in conformity with principles of justice and international law', including 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'; (3) the treatment of citizens as mere objects of GATT/WTO law and institutions rather than as 'democratic principals' of all governance institutions, 'agents of justice' and main economic actors; and (4) the deliberate neglect for the GATT/WTO legal obligations of 'consistent interpretation', 'judicial comity' and 'access to justice' in domestic courts in the 'dispute settlement system of the WTO' (Sections III and IV).
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Institute, Florence. Former professor at the University of Geneva and its Graduate Institute of International Studies. Former legal adviser in the Germany Ministry of Economic Affairs (1978) (1979) (1980) , in the GATT Secretariat (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) , legal consultant in GATT/ WTO (1990 WTO ( -2012 ) and secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels. The author wishes to thank Gabrielle Marceau for constructive criticism. This contribution was written for a special issue on the 'GATT/WTO Legal Affairs Division at 30' of the International Organizations Law Review 2013. 1 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Principles of World Trade, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Instalment No. 8 (1985) , 530 -539. similar to my own discovery -during my studies of international law at the University of Genevathat, in the words of the genius loci Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'it is to law alone, that men owe justice and liberty' (Discourse on Political Economy, 1750). The fact that all GATT contracting parties had adopted national constitutions (written or unwritten) seemed to prove their 'constitutional insight' that people can constrain their rational egoism (cf. Thomas Hobbes: homo homini lupus est) only through self-commitment to constitutional rules and institutional 'checks and balances' (like independent courts of justice) transforming private interests into public interests by empowering citizens to act as 'agents of justice' for the common good (like promotion of general consumer welfare through rulesbased competition and trade). Just as economic law had played a leading role in the long processes of constitutionalizing national societies, the postwar system of multilateral trade agreements establishing the European Communities (EC) offered obvious historical evidence of how the creative tensions between individualism, nationalism, international law and competition enable international trade law to induce international transformations (like compulsory jurisdiction for peaceful adjudication of disputes, the emergence of a new 'international common law' of multilevel trade governance) that elude policymakers in most other areas of international relations. Yet, the 'public reason' of social institutions remains shaped by the 'private reason', rational self-interests and unconscious instincts of its agents and 'principals', including the desires of many rulers to free their power politics of legal constraints and institutional 'checks and balances' (as illustrated by Dick the Butcher's advice -in Shakespeare's Henry the Sixth -to 'kill all the lawyers'). The deliberate decision not to establish an Office of Legal Affairs prior to 1982/83 reflected 35 years of anti-legal 'diplomatic management ideology' prevailing among GATT diplomats (as described by Frieder Roessler in his contribution to this volume), which had been a response also to the non-ratification of GATT 1947 by national parliaments and to the only 'provisional application' of GATT rules subject to 'existing legislation reservations'. As the rational self-interests of trade diplomats and rent-seeking interest groups -for instance in avoiding legal, democratic and judicial accountability for their often non-transparent and welfare-reducing trade protectionism redistributing domestic income for the benefit of powerful producer interests (e.g. cotton, textiles and agricultural producers in Europe and North-America) -continued to dominate many GATT policy and dispute settlement decisions during the 1980s, I decided to resume my academic career as of October 1989; at the request of Director-General A. Dunkel, I continued to service the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group elaborating the 'Dispute Settlement Understanding' (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as legal secretary only on the basis of a consultant contract.
The 'political miracle' of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in April 1994 entailed a 'legal revolution' in international relations, as illustrated by the fact that the DSU established -for the first time in human history -a worldwide, multilevel, compulsory dispute settlement jurisdiction (e.g. at the level of WTO panels, the WTO Appellate Body and WTO arbitration) and 'dispute settlement system of the WTO' (Article 3 DSU) providing also for individual 'access to justice' inside domestic jurisdictions and to transnational commercial arbitration inside the WTO. 2 Yet, my personal experiences as secretary in the Uruguay Round negotiations on the DSU, as secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels, and as legal consultant advising less-developed countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings (pursuant to Article 27 DSU) prompted me to increasingly criticize, already since the 1980s, two systemic failures of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement practices, as recalled in the concluding Sections III and IV: First, due to the self-interests and 'legal ignorance' of many trade diplomats (eg regarding the customary rules of treaty interpretation, state responsibility, and adjudication), most GATT dispute settlement panels during the 1980s continued to neglect the customary law requirement of interpreting the often indeterminate GATT rules and principles not only on the basis of their text, context, objective and purpose, but also 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', including 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', as recalled in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (cf its Preamble and Article 31) as well as in numerous UN treaties (eg Article 1 UN Charter). Discussions among GATT dispute settlement panelists and GATT Secretariat staff assisting them were often influenced by political rather than legal considerations, for instance  in the case of the three panel reports on EEC subsidies for wheat flour (1983) , pasta (1983) and canned fruit (1985) , which were never adopted in view of their unconvincing legal reasoning (eg that EEC subsidies for wheat flour had 'caused undue disturbance to normal commercial interests' of the USA in terms of GATT Article XVI:2 without resulting in the EEC 'having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product' in terms of Article XVI:3 GATT as interpreted by the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on Subsidies); 3  in the case of the -likewise un-adopted -panel report on EEC citrus preferences (1985) , where the panel clarified neither the 'uncertain legal status' of these preferential arrangements under Article XXIV GATT nor the legal basis for its 'non-violation' finding that the EEC had to compensate for the trade losses caused by 'trade diversion'; 4 or  when the GATT Secretariat division in charge of administrating the GATT Agreement on Antidumping refused to discuss whether the general international law rules on state responsibility justify a panel recommendation of reimbursing illegal antidumping duties, in conformity with the jurisprudence in many domestic legal and dispute settlement systems, and lawyers of the GATT Office of Legal Affairs were later excluded from GATT dispute settlement proceedings challenging antidumping measures
;
 or if other requests for more effective legal remedies were rejected -without reference to the customary rules on state responsibility, for instance on the ground that 'recommendations of this nature had not been within customary practice in dispute settlement under the GATT system'.
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 The resignation of the chairperson of the 'pasta panel' on the ground that he had been exposed to undue pressures from a French diplomat, and jokes about the close relationship of the French Director of the GATT division on agriculture to his former colleagues inside the EEC Commission, illustrated the politicized atmosphere of GATT panel proceedings during the 1980s challenging the EEC's agricultural policies.
Following the regular participation of the Office of Legal Affairs in GATT panel proceedings since 1984, the 'anti-legal dispute settlement traditions' of some operational GATT divisions gave rise to a few tensions, ushering in later decision by GATT Director-General Dunkel to exclude the Office of Legal Affairs from GATT dispute settlement proceedings involving antidumping and countervailing duty measures. As long as trade diplomats and their legal advocates in national Ministries insisted on power-oriented pursuit of 'national interests' in terms of 'political realism' 7 by exercising the WTO monitoring, rulemaking and dispute settlement functions without protecting justice for citizens -in blatant disregard for the customary rules on treaty interpretation, state responsibility and adjudication -, the WTO objective of 'providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU) cannot be realized. The path-dependent, intergovernmental treatment of citizens in GATT/WTO politics as mere objects of GATT/WTO rules runs counter to the customary law requirements of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes 'in conformity with principles of 3 For a critical discussion of these panel reports (SCM/42, 43, L/5778) see: R.Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law. The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworth 1993), at 147-157. 4 Cf. GATT document L/5776 and Hudec (note 3), at 157 ff. 5 Cf. Petersmann (note 2), at 79 f, 90 f, 224 ff. 6 'Trondheim panel report', GPR.DS2/R, at para. 4.17; cf Petersmann (note 2), at 230 ff. 7 For an overview of five different conceptions of foreign policies (realist theories, neoliberal 'regime theories', functionalism, public choice theories, constitutional theories) and their impact on the design of international trade law and institutions see: Petersmann (note 2), at 10 ff, 14 ff.
justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', as codified in the VCLT as well as in the law of ever more international organizations committed to the human rights obligations of all states (cf Articles 2 and 3 Lisbon Treaty on European Union). Having lectured constitutional law before practicing international economic law (IEL) as a legal advisor in national and international institutions, my arguments -since the 1980s -in favor of citizen-oriented 'constitutional interpretations' of GATT rules and dispute settlement procedures from the perspective of reasonable citizens ('methodological individualism') -i.e. focusing on the normative task of clarifying, justifying and developing IEL 'in conformity with principles of justice' so as to reconcile conflicts among public and private interests through 'public reason' consistent with 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' -remain relevant to date, notwithstanding their rejection as 'politically naïve' by poweroriented trade politicians and their 'Westphalian advocates' pointing to the disagreement on theories of IEL. 8 Fortunately, civil society and human rights advocates continue challenging welfare-reducing abuses of trade policy discretion neglecting consumer welfare, human rights and other 'principles of justice' that are nowhere explicitly mentioned in GATT/WTO law.
Second, as GATT/WTO law regulates the 'dispute settlement system of the WTO' (Article 3 DSU) in terms of multilevel legal obligations to protect equal freedoms, non-discriminatory competition and rule of law at international as well as domestic levels of trade regulation, it remains to be hoped thatas discussed in the concluding Section IV -future lawyers and courts of justice will take more seriously the 'consistent interpretation' and 'judicial comity' requirements of national and international legal systems (cf. Article 31 VCLT, Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement) requiring national, regional and WTO governance institutions and dispute settlement bodies to cooperate in their common task of 'providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU) in transnational trade transactions among citizens. The history of rights-based constitutionalism confirms the Kantian insight that humanity is capable of transforming power politics through 'constitutionalizing' authoritarian 'rule-by-law' and institutionalizing 'rule-of-law' for the benefit of citizens not only inside, but also across nations. Hence, I have argued since the 1980s 9 that national, regional and GATT dispute settlement bodies should follow the example of 'multilevel judicial cooperation' in European economic law, international investment, commercial and human rights law by interpreting and developing the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system for the benefit of citizens in order to provide 'security and stability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU), as illustrated by the WTO Appellate Body interpretations of the WTO legal requirements of 'fair price comparisons' in antidumping 'zeroing practices' for the benefit of adversely affected traders rather than at the whim of trade bureaucracies. 10 In the 21st century, multilevel governance of transnational public goods -like a rules-based world trading system protecting consumer welfare and rule of law, rather than the power of the rulers to tax citizens and redistribute domestic income through welfarereducing, discriminatory trade restrictions -must be justified and legally designed on the basis of 'cosmopolitan constitutionalism' recognizing citizens as ultimate sources of value, bearers of constitutional rights and 'democratic owners' ('principals') of all governance institutions. The 'sustainable development' and rule-of-law objectives of WTO law, like the limited powers of WTO institutions as 'agents' of citizens as their 'democratic principals', call for stronger constitutional restraints, judicial remedies and multilevel 'accountability mechanisms' limiting abuses of power by 'principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', as prescribed by the customary rules of international treaty interpretation and related adjudication. The two selection criteria -legal reasonableness and pragmatic handling of legal practices -remain at the center of the dialectic evolution of international and constitutional law systems aimed at reconciling utility-maximizing pursuit of rational self-interests (by the homo economicus) with the sociological evidence that voluntary rule-compliance by people depends on their acceptance of law as being justifiable by 'principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (homo ordinans, zoon autokrator). Inside the GATT Secretariat, Prof. Jan Tumlir -director of GATT's Research Division during the 1980s -was one of the few GATT officials who, in many of his publications, shared my convictions for the need for 'constitutional economics analyses' of trade policies and for stronger constitutional guarantees of non-discriminatory competition and protection of consumer welfare.11 As legal advisor in the German Ministry of Economic Affairs and representative of Germany in the EC, I had been able to observe how Germany's 'legal strategy' of supporting requests by European citizens for 'constitutional interpretations' and judicial enforcement of the customs union rules of EC law -which the drafters of the EC Treaty had copied from the corresponding GATT obligations of all EC member states12 -had enhanced the social and democratic acceptance and decentralized application of European common market law as a cosmopolitan legal system based not only on rights and duties of governments, but also on rights of citizens and 'public reasons' which people could share and support. As all UN member states had accepted commitments to respect, protect and fulfill human rights demanded by their citizens and to interpret international treaties in conformity with their human rights obligations (cf. Article 31 VCLT), constitutional theory supported my hope that the establishment of a new GATT Office of Legal Affairs could contribute to limiting intergovernmental power politics by justifying GATT rules also in terms of freedoms and other rights of citizens, as illustrated by the GATT provisions on individual access to justice (cf. Article X:3 GATT) and by 'constitutional economics' justifying international trade in terms of empowering citizens to benefit from mutually beneficial economic cooperation protected by constitutional and non-discriminatory trade and competition rules, as in EC common market and US antitrust law. It seemed obvious for a constitutional lawyer that the customary law requirement of interpreting treaties 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' was important for clarifying many vaguely drafted GATT provisions through 'due process of law', for instance the GATT provisions on 'violation complaints', 'non-violation complaints' and 'situation complaints' among GATT contracting parties (cf. GATT Article XXIII) as well as on individual access to justice (cf. Article X:3 GATT), which reflected the ancient legal distinctions between principles of distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity as discussed already in Aristotelian philosophy. 
I. The Establishment of a GATT

II. From 'Conciliation' to 'Due Process of Law' and 'Third Party Adjudication' in GATT Dispute Settlement Practices during the 1980s
The drafters of the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) had provided for third-party adjudication of international trade and economic disputes through legal rulings by the ITO Executive Board, with the possibility of an appeal to the plenary Conference of the ITO and a right to seek an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ. As GATT 1947 was negotiated on the basis of a limited negotiating authority of the US delegation and 'provisionally applied' since 1 January 1948 as a temporary contract for reciprocal tariff liberalization until its future incorporation into the ITO Charter, its dispute settlement provisions (notably GATT Articles XXII, XXIII) remained vague and less ambitious than those of the draft ITO Charter. Following the refusal by the US Congress to ratify the ITO Charter and the abandonment of the ITO in 1950, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIESi.e. the plenary meeting of the initially 23 signatory governments of GATT 1947 -progressively exercised and developed their dispute settlement authority under GATT Article XXIII, for instance by approving dispute settlement rulings by the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, by GATT Working Parties (including the parties to the dispute as well as other contracting parties with direct interests in the dispute) and, since 1952, by GATT dispute settlement panels composed of three of five neutral panelists (usually trade diplomats) from third countries. In these diverse dispute settlement procedures, the GATT Secretariat assisted trade diplomats in the drafting of their legal findings and in the progressive codification of GATT dispute settlement practices. From 1963 to 1970, the participation of the EC and of an ever larger number of less-developed GATT contracting parties sparked an 'anti-legalist movement within GATT' (Hudec) emphasizing the need for negotiations (e.g.
during the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations 1964-1967) and for 'pragmatic solutions' of legal challenges of the EC's common agricultural and preferential trade policies as well as of illegal trade barriers impeding developing country access to developed countries. 14 Since 1970, the number of GATT dispute settlement reports steadily increased. The Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979 included an 'Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance' codifying and developing GATT dispute settlement practices under Articles XXII and XXIII GATT. 15 Yet, since the four 1976 GATT panel reports on income tax practices in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the USA, the 1978 panel report on minimum import prices administered by the EEC, two GATT panels reports of 1979 and 1980 on EEC export subsidies for sugar, the 1980 GATT panel report on EEC restrictions on imports of apples, and the 1981 panel report on Spanish import restrictions on soya bean oil, the inadequate legal reasoning of GATT panel findings was increasingly criticized by governments and lawyers and risked undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the GATT dispute settlement system.
In a GATT Ministerial Decision adopted on 29 November 1982, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES gave the GATT Secretariat formal responsibility of assisting the dispute settlement panels, especially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with. In order to demonstrate his support for the Office of Legal Affairs, Director-General Dunkel decided to locate the new Legal Office next to his own office inside the Centre William Rappard. Since 1983, Messrs Lindén, Roessler and myself progressively participated in GATT panel proceedings until the DirectorGeneral formally decided that the servicing by the Secretariat of GATT dispute settlement panels was the joint responsibility of the operational division in charge of the subject-matter (usually drafting the factual parts of the panel report) as well as of the Office of Legal Affairs (usually drafting the legal findings in the panel report). Only exceptionally, if there was no operational GATT division with special expertise (e.g. on tax legislation), would a GATT dispute settlement panel be served exclusively by the Office of Legal Affairs. 16 In the GATT 'Basic Instruments and Selected Documents', GATT dispute settlement reports continued to be published under the heading 'conciliation'. But the increasing influence of GATT lawyers on the legal findings prompted GATT dispute settlement panels to progressively apply and cite the customary methods of treaty interpretation (as codified in the VCLT) and other rules and principles of international law. Working inside GATT's Office of Legal Affairs allowed me to take numerous initiatives, such as arranging official meetings with judges from the European Court of Justice and inviting retired judges to serve as GATT panelists. The legal arguments submitted by lawyers from the GATT Secretariat to GATT panelists occasionally provoked counter-pressures. For instance, when a former judge from the EC Court of Justice chaired a GATT dispute settlement panel and disagreed with the legal advice from the GATT Secretariat, he convened legal deliberations by the 3 GATT panelists without presence of lawyers from the GATT Secretariat and drafted himself the legal findings of the panel. But his insistence on presenting himself his final panel report to the GATT Council prompted GATT DirectorGeneral Dunkel to tell me that this kind of 'legalist lecture' to GATT ambassadors merited no repeating. The increasing number of GATT panel findings against antidumping and countervailing duties imposed by the USA prompted the USA to block the adoption of a large number of panel reports under the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements on Antidumping and Subsidies ushering in a decision by Director-General Dunkel -following a request from US Trade Representative Carla Hills pointing to the political risks of adverse panel findings for approval by the US Congress of future Uruguay Round Agreements -to limit the participation of lawyers from GATT's Office of Legal 14 Cf. Hudec (note 13), at 109 ff, and the chronological listing of all GATT dispute settlement proceedings under GATT Article XXIII in: Petersmann (note 2), at 248 ff. 15 Cf. The Tokyo Round Agreements (GATT 1986), at 200 ff.
Affairs in the often politicized disputes over antidumping and countervailing duties administered by the GATT Secretariat Division specialized in antidumping, countervailing duties and subsidies. 17 Until the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1987, almost all panel reports submitted to the GATT Council under Article XXIII:2 GATT had been adopted and, in most cases, also implemented. Only in respect of a few panel reports, the GATT Council either adopted the reports subject to an 'understanding' that amounted to a partial revision of the relevant legal findings 18 , or refrained from adopting the panel report. But also in the case of the four GATT panel reports not adopted under Article XXIII during the 38 years of GATT 1947 19 until its termination in 1995, the disputing parties settled their dispute on the basis of the panel report. Thus, the 'legal filtering' and non-adoption by the GATT Council of these reports reflected an attempt at avoiding legally wrong interpretations (e.g. in the Soyabeans and Citrus panel findings) or at keeping open interpretative issues (e.g. in the Canned Fruit and Gold Coins cases) which the defendants continued to challenge; arguably, the dispute settlement process under GATT Article XXIII had not broken down. In his annual report to the GATT Council in 1989, the GATT Director-General emphasized with regard to the general GATT dispute settlement procedure: 'Overall, the experience with the adoption of panel reports continues to be good. There has so far been no instance in which a panel report was neither adopted nor implemented merely because the party complained against refused to accept the panel's recommendations ' . 20 Yet, even though the Uruguay Round negotiations remained dominated by diplomats interested in protecting their self-interests (such as limiting their legal accountability vis-à-vis citizens 21 ), the DSU reforms of the GATT dispute settlement system reflected widespread dissatisfaction with GATT's 'diplomats jurisprudence'. If the GATT dispute settlement system is evaluated from a broader 'constitutional perspective' as reflected in the customary rules of treaty interpretation, two 'systemic failures' remain outstanding, as summarized in the concluding Sections III and IV.
III. Lack of 'Democratic Public Reason' in GATT/WTO 'Diplomats Jurisprudence'? Need for Taking the Customary Rules of Treaty Interpretation More Seriously
Compared with GATT 1947 and the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements, the 1994 WTO Agreement and the compulsory 'dispute settlement system of the WTO' (Article 3 DSU) have strengthened the systemic character of GATT/WTO law in terms of both its 'primary rules of conduct' and its 'secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication'. 22 According to Article 3 of the DSU, the 'dispute settlement of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of those agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law' (para.2). 17 Cf. E.U.Petersmann (note 2), at 90 f. The explicit reference to the customary rules of treaty interpretation was inserted into the DSU so as to terminate, once and for all, the frequent neglect -by GATT diplomats, GATT panelists and GATT officials without legal training -for general international law as relevant legal context for interpreting GATT rules. Yet, WTO dispute settlement bodies continue neglecting that the customary rules of treaty interpretation and adjudication require interpreting treaties and settling related disputes not only on the basis of the text, context, objective and purpose of the applicable rules; as explicitly recalled in the Preamble and Article 31 VCLT, treaty interpretation and adjudication must also remain 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law', including 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' (cf. Preamble and Article 31 VCLT), as confirmed in numerous UN legal instruments. As Article 23 DSU on the 'Strengthening of the Multilateral System' requires all WTO Members to settle disputes 'consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding', impartial and independent adjudication has become of constitutional importance for rule-clarification and dispute settlement under WTO law, especially in times of global economic and poverty crises and political disagreement on consensus-based rule-making and 'authoritative interpretations' by the political WTO bodies. As citizens and governments with often conflicting worldviews are unlikely to ever agree on any comprehensive theory of justice, they must focus on 'an overlapping consensus' (J.Rawls) limited to 'principles of justice' that must be consistent with 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', as recalled in the VCLT. By clarifyoing from impartial and independent perspectives how international treaties ratified by parliaments for the benefit of citizens have to be construed 'in conformity with principles of justice' and the universal human rights obligations of UN member states, courts of justice must justify their legal findings in terms of 'principles of justice' that can be supported and shared as legitimate 'opinio juris' by governments and citizens without prejudice to their often diverse worldviews. As recalled by the ICJ and numerous other international courts:
'Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and therefore in that sense equitable.' 23 'Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it.' 24 One unique feature of the 'dispute settlement system of the WTO' is that the discussion and, so far, approval of all panel and Appellate Body reports by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) enables all WTO governments to voice any disagreements with dispute settlement interpretations in order to inform and guide future WTO jurisprudence. Yet, the exclusive composition of the DSB by diplomats -without any 'voice' for the often millions of producers, traders, investors, consumers, companies, civil society institutions and parliaments affected by WTO dispute settlement rulings -also limits the democratic legitimacy and 'public reason' of DSB decisions on WTO dispute settlement reports.
How to Justify GATT/WTO Rules vis-à-vis Citizens as 'Agents of Justice'?
Justice is essentially about the human right of citizens to justification of law and governance vis-à-vis citizens with due respect for their human rights. 25 As subjects of inalienable human rights, citizens are 'democratic principals' and 'agents of justice' of modern international law and can assess the demands of justice only through 'deliberative' and 'participatory democracy' institutionalizing their 'public reason'. The systemic exclusion of citizens and national parliaments from intergovernmental rulemaking in the WTO entails 'discourse failures' (such as the systemic omission of human rights and consumer welfare from WTO rules and WTO discourse) that undermine the legitimacy of WTO governance and its contribution to protecting human rights. Some UN treaty 'constitutions' (sic) -for instance, the constitutions (sic) establishing the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) -explicitly justify their functionally limited treaty regimes for the protection of international public goods demanded by citizens in terms of protection of labor rights and social justice (through ILO law), the human right to health (through WHO law), freedom from hunger (through FAO law) and human rights to education, democratic self-government and rule of law (through UNESCO conventions). UN human rights law acknowledges and justifies ever more 'inalienable' human rights by respect for the reasonableness, dignity, morality ('conscience'), human autonomy and basic needs of individuals who are recognized as being entitled not only to individual and democratic self-determination, but also to 'a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized' (Article 28 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights = UDHR). Yet, the more globalization transforms national public goods into transnational 'aggregate public goods' (like a rules based trading system), the more national (big C) Constitutions turn out to be 'partial constitutions' that can no longer protect many public goods without international law and institutions. As UN member states have increasingly confirmed human rights to 'sustainable development' and the need for collective supply of international public goods through international law and multilevel governance institutions 26 , human rights law requires interpreting international law -including WTO treaty objectives like 'sustainable development' (WTO Preamble) and 'providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU) -from democratic perspectives enabling citizens to understand themselves as co-authors of international law, democratic owners ('principals') of all governance institutions (as 'agents' with constitutionally limited powers), and as 'agents of justice' and main legal subjects of legal systems. This is particularly true for IEL regulating mutually beneficial trade transactions among citizens. The explicit commitments of WTO law to the customary law requirements of interpreting and clarifying the often indeterminate WTO rules (e.g. on 'national treatment', 'non-violation complaints') 'in conformity with principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' justify legal presumptions that national parliaments have ratified the WTO guarantees of economic freedoms, non-discriminatory conditions of competition, rule of law and governmental protection of noneconomic public interests (like 'public order', human health) so as to protect corresponding interests and rights of citizens rather than only rights and duties of governments. Just as national and international courts construe European economic law, international investment law, intellectual property law and human rights law as justifying cosmopolitan rights of citizens (e.g. investor rights derived from international investment treaties, human rights recognized by UN human rights conventions), the citizen-oriented functions of trade law justify 'inclusive, constitutional interpretations' for the benefit of citizens as main economic actors and legal subjects of democratic legal systems.
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How to Interpret GATT/WTO Rules for the Benefit of Citizens?
Utilitarian trade and power politics aimed at maximizing 'Kaldor-Hicks efficiency' (i.e. regardless of the distribution of the gains from trade) risks being inconsistent with the human rights obligations of governance institutions to respect, protect and fulfill the fundamental rights of every individual. Ronald Dworkin's distinction of the following 'four stages of legal theory' illustrates how much doctrinal concepts of the GATT/WTO legal and dispute settlement system depend on judicial clarification of 'principles of justice': 26 Cf. E.U. Petersmann, International Economic Law in the 21st Century. Constitutional Pluralism and Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods (Oxford: Hart, 2012). 27 On the 'constitutional functions' of many international economic rules to protect 'constitutional values' -like legal certainty, non-discrimination, rule of law, economic freedoms, property rights, transparent policy-making and access to justice -recognized in domestic constitutional law systems see Petersmann (note 8).
 at the 'semantic stage', legal terms (like justice, human rights, liberty, non-discrimination, 'trade under fully competitive conditions', rule of law, a 'fair comparison' of the export price with 'the normal value' of imported goods ) tend to be 'interpretive concepts' which people share even if they disagree about the criteria for identifying injustice and for applying such 'interpretive concepts'; hence, a 'useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be an interpretation, which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the concept figures'
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, with due regard to the legitimate interests of all affected persons;  at the 'jurisprudential stage', the legal interpreter must search for the values that supply the best interpretation of the aspirational values of legal concepts like rule of law, including the 'ideal of political integrity' as a requirement of governing 'through a coherent set of political principles whose benefits extend to all citizens' and legitimize coercive power of states;
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 at the 'doctrinal stage', the 'truth conditions of propositions of law' must be constructed 'in the light of the values identified at the jurisprudential stage' so that legal justifications fit the practice as well as the values that the practice serves (e.g. the constitutional and procedural practices in which legal claims are embedded);
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 at the 'adjudicative stage', courts of justice deploying the monopoly of coercive power must impartially and independently review whether the enforcement of the law in particular cases by political officials is legally justified by 'the best interpretation of legal practice overall'; 31 according to Dworkin's 'adjudicative principle of integrity', judges should interpret law -in conformity with its objectives of legality, rule-of-law and its underlying constitutional principles of justice -as expressing 'a coherent conception of justice and fairness': 'Law as integrity asks judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person's situation is fair and just according to the same standards.'
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The customary rules of treaty interpretation confirm that 'principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all' -rather than foreign policy discretion to tax and restrict domestic citizens in welfare-reducing ways (e.g. through tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers) and to engage in allegedly 'efficient breaches' of international treaties ratified by parliaments for the benefit of citizens -are the relevant principles for interpreting and justifying GATT/WTO rules. Similar to Dworkin's distinction between 'four stages of legal theory', John Rawls explains why independent and impartial courts can operate as 'exemplars of public reason' defending human rights and other constitutional 'principles of justice' against majority politics and related abuses of public and private power. 33 Lawin contrast to natural sciences -is not about discovering 'objective truth out there'; it is rather about 'institutionalizing public reason' through constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial rulemaking, participatory rule-clarification (eg through judicial remedies of individuals) and 'deliberative democracy' in response to civil society challenges of the ubiquity of abuses of public and private powers. Diplomatic monopolization of intergovernmental rulemaking (eg in secretive GATT/WTO negotiations) without effective parliamentary and democratic control risks undermining general consumer welfare and human rights, which diplomats deliberately refrained from mentioning anywhere explicitly in GATT/WTO law. The 'public choice hypothesis' -i.e. that all power risks being abused by the rational self-interests of the rulers -is confirmed by the empirical fact that IEL systems with stronger multilevel 'constitutional checks and balances' -like European economic law and international investment law -tend to be construed by national and international courts as protecting also rights of citizens even if the international rules were addressed to states without explicitly providing for cosmopolitan rights:
'the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in compliance with the obligations thus laid down (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, par. 31). Such consideration must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty, which … is designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market'. 34 The institutionalized independence and more impartial reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body have weakened the dependence of many ad hoc WTO panels on the diplomatic reasoning of non-lawyers serving as WTO panelists as well as on the assistance from operational WTO Secretariat divisions involved in WTO negotiations (and tempted to use their drafting of WTO panel reports for advancing political negotiation positions favored by them). For instance, in the almost 20 WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging the protectionist 'zeroing practices' of EC and US antidumping authorities in their calculations of antidumping duties, the WTO Appellate Body has rightly interpreted the WTO requirement of 'fair price comparisons' from the perspective of the reasonable interests of economic actors rather than -as advocated by the WTO panels in conformity with the advice given to them by the WTO's 'Rules Division' (dealing with antidumping, countervailing duty and subsidy practices) -from the perspective of EC and US antidumping bureaucracies claiming that they had not intended to limit their 'sovereign right to apply zeroing methodologies' by concluding the WTO Agreement on Antidumping. 35 Yet, most WTO dispute settlement reports fail to balance private and public interests in terms of 'principles of justice' and 'human rights and fundamental freedoms for all', contrary to the customary methods of treaty interpretation.
The 'Diplomatic Capture' of UN and WTO Institutions Serves the Self-Interests of the Rulers
Professor Hudec's analysis of 'The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence' 36 explained the GATT dispute settlement practices as primarily the work of diplomats and of GATT Secretariat officials rather than of lawyers. 'Public choice' theory explains why such 'public choices' (e.g. of not establishing a GATT Office of Legal Affairs from 1948 up to 1983) in 'political markets' tend to be no less influenced by individual self-interests of rational actors than 'private choices' in economic markets. 37 Most UN and GATT/WTO diplomats favor 'Westphalian conceptions' of international law and worldwide institutions based on power-oriented, intergovernmental claims  to limit international law to rights and obligations of states without regard to the legitimacy of governments in the many non-democratic UN member states and to whether national 'gains from trade' are used for protecting human rights and popular self-determination or the selfinterests of the rulers;
 to focus on 'national interests' as defined by national interest groups rather than on protection of human rights and general consumer welfare that are not mentioned in most worldwide economic and environmental agreements;  to separate national and international legal systems and exclude legal, judicial and democratic remedies of citizens against welfare-reducing violations of international treaty obligations; and  to treat citizens as mere objects of international law -rather than as democratic 'principals' of all governance institutions -so as to avoid legal and democratic challenges of welfare-reducing, intergovernmental power politics and undersupply of international public goods resulting in unnecessary poverty of more than 1 billion people living on 1$ or less per day.
During the 1980s, trade diplomats engaged in hundreds of bilateral export restraint agreements and other 'grey area trade restrictions' redistributing domestic income from consumers to rent-seeking industries in exchange for political support -often without parliamentary authorization, democratic accountability and judicial control. 38 As trade policy-making in GATT was driven by power politics and alleged 'state interests' (e.g. to restrict imports of cotton and textiles from less-developed countries), also GATT Secretariat officials participating in GATT dispute settlement proceedings often responded to the political pressures 'pragmatically' in order to reconcile GATT rules and dispute settlement practices with the 'political realities' in multilevel governance of international trade. The political opposition to the establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs prior to 1982 came mainly from EC trade diplomats concerned about legal challenges of their discriminatory trade restrictions favoring import competing producers (e.g. of agricultural and textiles products inside the EC) and preferential trade with former European colonies. Trade diplomats tend to be agnostic of 'legal systems', and are inclined to interpret the 'object and purpose' of trade rules for the benefit of the rulers (e.g. in terms of 'Kaldor-Hicks efficiency' rather than consumer welfare) and of their foreign policy discretion to negotiate 'political bargains' redistributing the 'gains from trade' and circumventing the rules ratified by national parliaments for the benefit of citizens. The 'anti-legalism' cultivated in GATT diplomacy was designed to avoid legal, democratic and judicial accountability of diplomats for the welfare-reducing effects of their trade protectionism in collaboration with rentseeking industries. My publications emphasized since the 1980s that -from the different point of view of reasonable citizens benefitting from a mutually beneficial division of labor based on transnational rule of law -GATT legal guarantees of economic freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and sovereign rights to protect non-economic public goods (e.g. pursuant to Article XX GATT) could serve 'constitutional functions' for protecting human rights, economic freedoms, non-discriminatory conditions of competition and transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens and economic actors participating in the global division of labor; as such 'constitutional interpretations' were -rightlyperceived as a political threat by trade diplomats requesting national and European courts to refrain from reviewing their persistent violations of GATT law to the detriment of consumer welfare, rule-oflaw, democracy and equal rights of citizens 39 , I remain grateful to GATT Director-General Dunkel for having rejected requests from GATT diplomats to exclude from the GATT Secretariat officials daring to criticize -in private, academic publications subject to 'disclaimers' -the economic inefficiency and illegality of certain antidumping and other 'grey area trade practices'. 38 Cf. E.U.Petersmann (note 8), at 104 ff. 39 Cf. Petersmann (note 9).
IV. Diplomatic Failures to Protect the 'Multilateral Trading System' and 'Dispute Settlement System of the WTO' as Cosmopolitan Legal Systems
Constitutional democracies and European law protect mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation among citizens inside domestic jurisdictions as 'cosmopolitan legal orders' with constitutional and judicial guarantees not only of civil and political, but also of economic and social rights of citizens (eg as protected under domestic constitutional, competition and social laws). 40 Also international investment, intellectual property and human rights conventions among states, and some free trade agreements, are construed by national and international courts as protecting not only rights of governments, but also of their citizens. Hence, during my more than 30 years work in GATT and the WTO, I consistently argued for interpreting precise and unconditional GATT/WTO guarantees of economic freedoms, non-discrimination, rule of law and 'access to justice' as protecting also individual rights, 41 to the dismay of trade diplomats considering 'justice', 'human rights' and 'constitutional discourse' as potential threats to their 'pragmatic management' of trade politics.
Access to Justice in GATT/WTO Law?
The more globalization transforms national public goods demanded by citizens into international 'aggregate public goods' that national Constitutions can protect only together with international law and multilevel governance institutions, the more important become multilevel guarantees of 'access to justice' extending legal and judicial remedies beyond civil and political rights of citizens. For instance:
 Some national Constitutions have responded to systemic governance failures by providing for broad legal and judicial remedies whenever 'rights are violated by public authority' (Article 19:4 German Basic Law).
 Some regional economic agreements (like the Lisbon Treaty) are explicitly committed to facilitating 'access to justice' (Article 67:4 TFEU), 'rule of law' (Article 2 TEU) and a 'right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial' whenever 'rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated' (Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights).
 The GATT and the WTO Agreements include a large number of requirements to make available judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals and independent review procedures not only at international governance levels among WTO members, but also in domestic legal systems in the field of GATT (cf Article X), the WTO Antidumping Agreement (cf Article 13), the WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation (cf Article 11), the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (cf. Article 4), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (cf Article 23), the General Agreement on Trade in Services (cf Article VI GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (cf Articles 41-50, 59 TRIPS) and the Agreement on Government Procurement (cf Article XX).
 In international investment law, the legal guarantees of access to justice at national and international levels (eg in the ICJ) have become supplemented by more than 2'800 bilateral and regional treaty guarantees of individual access to transnational arbitration. 40 Cf. Petersmann (note 26), chapter III, and A.Stone Sweet, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe, in: Global Constitutionalism 1 (2012), 53-90, who defines a 'cosmopolitan legal order' as 'a transnational legal system in which all public officials bear the obligation to fulfill the fundamental rights of every person within their jurisdiction, without respect to nationality or citizenship' (p. 53). Constitutional protection of economic freedoms is more widespread in European countries protecting broadly defined equal freedoms as 'first principle of justice' (e.g. as justified by Kantian and Rawlsian theories of justice); cf. Hilf/Petersmann (note 37). 41 See, e.g., Petersmann (note 2), at 194 ff, 233 ff.
 Some environmental conventions -like the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Mattersprotect individual 'access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and impartial body established by law' (Article 9) in transnational environmental regulation.
 UN and regional human rights covenants (eg Article 34 ECHR, the Optional Protocol to the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) increasingly extend protection of individual access to legal and (quasi)judicial remedies in case of violation of economic and social rights beyond national courts subject to prior exhaustion of local remedies.
The terms 'effective remedy' and 'access to justice' are often used interchangeably for protecting  individual rights to effective access to a dispute resolution body;
 rights to fair proceedings;
 rights to timely resolution of disputes;
 rights to adequate redress; and  the principle of efficiency and effectiveness of legal remedies.
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In view of the global economic, environmental and poverty crises and the failures of many UN member states to respect, protect and fulfill their human rights obligations inside and beyond national jurisdictions, citizens and courts of justice increasingly insist on 'constitutional' and 'human rights approaches' to transnational economic regulation, for instance by claiming that -similar to multilevel human rights law, international criminal law, European economic integration law, international investment and commercial law and arbitration -also international trade law should be interpreted, developed and protected by national and international courts as a rights-based, participatory system of multilevel governance protecting individual access to justice and rule of law more effectively by holding governments accountable for their welfare-reducing violations of IEL to the detriment of ruleof-law and non-discriminatory, mutually beneficial cooperation among citizens across national frontiers. Just as multilevel economic regulation inside the EU protects market freedoms and social rights as fundamental rights, the human right to 'a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized' (Article 28 UDHR) calls for linking IEL to the human rights obligations of all governments, as already proposed by US President Roosevelt in his 'Four Freedoms' speech of 1941 explaining the need for 'a world founded upon four essential human freedoms' (ie of speech, belief, freedom from fear and from want). Globalization confirms that human rights -notwithstanding their protection also of diverse individual as well as collective identities (such as national, religious, class, racial, gender identities and communities with diverse civilizations) -remain the common 'foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world' (Preamble UDHR) and universally recognized 'conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained' (Preamble UN Charter).
The Lack of 'Cosmopolitan Public Reason' Undermines the Legitimacy, Effectiveness and Decentralized Coordination of the Rules-Based World Trading System
The fact that WTO governance institutions do not protect justice vis-à-vis individuals, and that WTO diplomats -also in constitutional democracies like the EU and the USA -continue to request domestic courts to refrain from reviewing compliance by governments with their WTO obligations in order to allow diplomats 'freedom of maneuver' without legal accountability democratic legitimacy of WTO law. It also weakens the coherence of the multilevel trading system with its decentralized implementation and enforcement by private economic actors, national legislators, governments, regulatory agencies and courts of justice in the 159 WTO members. A multilevel legal and trading system depends on a shared system of reasoning promoting decentralized coordination, transnational rule of law and an 'overlapping consensus' on 'principles of justice' supported by citizens, governments and non-governmental economic actors in spite of their often diverse self-interests and democratic preferences for diverse national Constitutions. 44 Like citizens in a pluralistic, democratic society, also economic actors participating in the global division of labor share practical and moral coordination problems requiring reciprocal commitments to constituting, limiting, regulating and justifying multilevel governance institutions for the benefit of citizens, their human rights and rational self-interests in mutually beneficial economic and social cooperation. 45 As the global division of labor is driven by demand and supply among private producers, investors, traders and consumers benefitting from rules-based cooperation and interested in the decentralized enforcement of just rules, transnational IEL requires justification by cosmopolitan rights, rule of law, democratic empowerment and self-governance among free and equal citizens no less than economic law inside constitutional democracies. Multilevel legal and judicial guarantees of transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens can resolve the 'mutual assurance problem' that rational and reasonable actors will support 'rule of law' only if it is based on fair terms for social cooperation giving the assurance that others will likewise do so. By offering 'public reasons' for resolving conflicts over rights and questions of justice on the basis of rule of law, public adjudication assures citizens of the fairness of law and of rules-based social cooperation: 'Public reasons are the building blocks of an autonomous public political morality' and for 'a shared logic of cooperation that is independent of each one's personal conception of the good'. 46 Just as theories of justice emphasize that 'principles of justice' must be mutually agreed by citizens (as agents of justice) behind a 'veil of uncertainty' (J.Rawls) promoting impartiality and reasonableness vis-à-vis all citizens (similar to impartial judicial administration of justice), economists (like A. Sen) and political philosophers (like M.Nussbaum) likewise emphasize that -'if the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public reasoning, and if public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of democracy -there is an intimate connection between justice and democracy' 47 ; legitimate trade and economic policies must 45 On the importance for people to agree on shared reasons for just laws coordinating a 'stable equilibrium' in the decentralized application and enforcement of rules by individual agents that will support the institutions and interactions required by a political conception of justice only if they can be reasonably assured that they will benefit as a result, see: G.K.Hadfield/S.Macedo, Rational Reasonableness: Toward a Positive Theory of Public Reason, in: University of Southern California Law and Economics Working Paper Series: Working Paper 127 (2011). 46 Hadfield/Macedo (note 45), at 7, who define 'public reason' as a 'system of reasons that all can participate in' as an essential, reciprocal 'coordinating device' in societies that depend on decentralized support of rules and their justification by 'principles of justice' for the stability and legitimacy of legal regimes. In view of the permanent fact of 'reasonable disagreement' among citizens over their respective conceptions of a 'good life' and over comprehensive theories of political justice, public reason must be limited to an 'overlapping consensus' (J.Rawls) among people with often conflicting moral and political worldviews. For instance, GATT/WTO law focuses on voluntary market access commitments subject to 'general exceptions' reserving sovereign rights to unilaterally adopt trade restrictions necessary for protecting non-economic public goods which people may legitimately define differently in different jurisdictions. 47 focus on promotion of 'human capacities' and reduction of injustices 48 rather than on trade policy discretion to distribute 'protection rents' to rent-seeking interest groups in exchange for political support.
The 'Dispute Settlement System of the WTO' Requires Multilevel Judicial Protection of Transnational Rule of Law for the Benefit of Citizens
Independent and impartial, national as well as international courts of justice have legitimate constitutional reasons for using their constitutional powers for 'administrating justice' by protecting cosmopolitan rights of citizens and transnational rule of law in mutually beneficial trade transactions among citizens across national frontiers. As WTO law protects 'access to justice' at national levels (e.g. in domestic courts seized by citizens in order to review illegal trade restrictions), at transnational levels (e.g. in commercial arbitration in the WTO at the request of exporters challenging trade restrictions imposed by preshipment inspection companies pursuant to the WTO Agreement on Preshipment Inspection) and international levels, the 'consistent interpretation' and 'judicial comity' requirements underlying national and international legal systems (cf. Article 31 VCLT) require multilevel trade adjudication bodies to cooperate in their common task of 'providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU). If the purpose of democratically legitimate law is to 'institutionalize public reason' through constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial and international rulemaking and adjudication for the benefit of citizens, then the GATT legal and dispute settlement system should be interpreted not only as protecting rights and obligations of governments, but also human rights, transnational rule of law, constitutional and legislative rights of citizens and 'principles of justice', as explicitly recognized in national and international legal systems. 49 Even though the GATT/WTO provisions on access to justice at national, transnational and international levels of dispute settlement do not provide for uniform standards of judicial review, the explicit legal commitment to 'the dispute settlement system of the WTO (as) a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system' (Article 3 DSU) justifies interpreting the multilevel GATT/WTO legal and dispute settlement provisions in mutually coherent ways for the benefit of citizens in order to reduce transaction costs and legal insecurity of private economic actors. Just as inside constitutional democracies (e.g. in US antitrust law) and regional economic integration law (e.g. of the EU and EEA) individual plaintiffs invoking and enforcing competition and trade rules in domestic courts have been likened to 'attorney generals' pursuing individual as well as 'community interests' 50 , the customary law requirement of interpreting WTO rules 'in conformity with the principles of justice and international law' require impartial courts of justice to promote 'consistent interpretations' of multilevel trade regulation protecting also cosmopolitan rights of traders, producers, investors and consumers participating in the mutually 48 On the necessary limitation of economic 'gross domestic product' approaches by human rights approaches and complementary 'capabilities' and 'human development approaches' to international economic regulation see: M.C.Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). The liberal egalitarian theory of justice of John Rawls supports only weak international duties of assistance in view of the primarily domestic causes of poverty inside states. By contrast, human rights law and cosmopolitan theories of justice recognize more comprehensive extraterritorial obligations aimed at respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights -and limiting majoritarian domination and 'harmful externalities' of the existing 'basic structures' of international relations -also in transnational cooperation among citizens and in foreign jurisdictions. A.Sen (note 47) rightly emphasizes that a 'theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of judging how to reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just societies' (p. ix). 49 On the multilevel GATT legal and dispute settlement system see Petersmann (note 2), at 233 ff; on the 'constitutional functions' of certain IMF and GATT economic rules see Petersmann (note 8), at 210 ff. 50 beneficial, global division of labor. 51 The 'consistent interpretation' and 'judicial comity' principles offer sufficiently flexible methods of respecting legitimate 'constitutional pluralism' and the diverse conceptions of international economic law, for instance perceiving  WTO law as a part of public international law regulating the international economy on the basis of 'sovereign equality of states';
 WTO law as global administrative law aimed at limiting also abuses of power through multilevel administrative law principles underlying the law of international organizations and of constitutional democracies, such as principles of transparency, legal accountability, limited delegation of powers, due process of law and judicial remedies; or  WTO law as multilevel economic regulation prescribing the use of efficient trade policy instruments (e.g. non-discriminatory regulation, tariffs and subsidies rather than discriminatory non-tariff trade barriers) with due respect for 'constitutional pluralism' inside national jurisdictions. As first explained by Kantian legal theory, state-centered 'multilevel constitutionalism' cannot effectively protect human rights and other international public goods (like a rules-based world trading system) without additional multilevel constitutional safeguards of cosmopolitan rights institutionalizing 'public reason' and limiting the rational pursuit of self-interests in all human interactions at national, transnational and international levels. 53 The historical evolution of rightsbased, transnational commercial law, human rights law, constitutional democracies, regional economic integration law and international investment law confirms the insight of the German jurist R.Jhering who noted, almost a century ago, that the 'life of the law' often depends on citizens struggling for their rights; such 'struggle for his rights' may be a 'duty of the person whose rights have been violated' as well as a 'duty to society'. 54 Trade policies -like many other policy areas -remain subject to constant conflicts of interests and struggles for power, for instance between consumers benefiting from liberal trade and import-competing producers benefiting from trade protection. In 1983, the former GATT Director-General O.Long invited Mr. Lindén and myself to a series of 'working lunches' in order to review the legal dimensions of his draft lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law on La Place du Droit et Ses Limites dans le Système Commercial Multilatéral du GATT. 55 Mr. Long emphasized the limits of law in GATT negotiations and diplomacy and concluded:
'Au stade actuel, le droit du GATT, comme, d'une façon générale, le droit économique international, est profondément marqué de pragmatisme. Il doit s'adapter, dans ses règles de fond comme dans ses procédures, aux réalités de la politique commerciale. Il semble se prêter mal à des considérations de nature doctrinale. Nous nous sommes efforcé de le décrire tel qu'il est, sans enjolivures.' of international law), 'constitutional interpretations' of WTO rules in multilevel trade adjudication would not radically change the interpretation of rights and obligations among WTO members. The unique WTO legal system of discussing and approving WTO dispute settlement reports in the intergovernmental WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the power of WTO members to adopt authoritative interpretations of WTO law, and the sovereign rights of WTO members to decide on their own methods of implementing WTO obligations in their domestic legal systems would ensure that governments would continue to control 'constitutional reasoning' and the legitimate 'constitutional pluralism' governing domestic polities. Even if WTO members remain unlikely to ever agree on any comprehensive theory of justice, justifying WTO rules in terms of principles of distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity could also help clarifying the legitimate scope of violation complaints, non-violation complaints and 'situation complaints' in GATT/WTO law and strengthen transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens.
After 12 years of Doha Round negotiations on trade liberalization and regulation inside the WTO, governments and economic actors increasingly emphasize the advantages of negotiating regional and plurilateral trade agreements outside the WTO. A 'constitutional approach' argues for interpreting such multilevel trade regulation and trade adjudication as integral parts of the 'multilateral trading system' as defined in WTO law (e.g. Article XXIV GATT). Rather than alienating citizens and national parliaments by excluding them from WTO governance, non-governmental economic actors and 'WTO citizens' should be recognized as legal subjects of WTO law entitled to rely on multilevel legal protection of WTO law in multilevel trade governance. The WTO objective of 'sustainable development' -if construed in conformity with the UN resolutions on 'sustainable development' as a human right of individuals and of people -could support the argument of this contribution that the customary law requirements of treaty interpretation justify cosmopolitan interpretations of the WTO legal and dispute settlement system offering citizens incentives for decentralized support and enforcement of WTO rules through domestic courts of justice. The 'rational choice model' underlying the WTO's one-sided focus on power-oriented utility maximization must be replaced by the 'reasonable choice models' of constitutional theories of justice, impartial adjudication and rule-of-law balancing individual pursuit of interests with the reasonable interests of all other citizens. The same 'principles of justice' that citizens support inside constitutional democracies as necessary constitutional restraints on rational egoism (such as human rights, rule of law, democratic selfgovernance) must guide the necessary cosmopolitan reforms of international law and institutions for the collective supply of international public goods demanded by citizens. Contrary to the statement by former GATT Director-General O. Long 30 years ago59, the time has come for justifying WTO law and adjudication by 'principles of justice' that citizens, parliaments and governments can share in spite of their legitimately diverse conceptions of social justice.
